An invisible maritime menace Mysterious drones spy on Western defenses as cargo ships linked to Russia cruise European waters
Russia may be spying on Western military assets and infrastructure using drones launched from passing civilian ships, and European countries cannot find a way to prove it, let alone stop it, according to a new report by investigative outlet The Dossier Center. Journalists tracked two civilian vessels that may have been launching drones to spy on German military assets and infrastructure in the North Sea and the Kiel area. Meduza summarizes The Dossier Center’s findings.
The Lauga
On the night of May 17, 2025, a German patrol vessel started following the Lauga near Borkum Island in the North Sea after noticing a swarm of drones around the Russian cargo ship. The two vessels and the drones moved in procession for roughly three hours, but the aircraft disappeared before German officials could determine their model type or confirm that the Lauga had launched them.
When the ship arrived at the Belgian port of Zeebrugge on May 28, local customs officials executed a search, acting on a tip from the German authorities. However, the inspection found no evidence of drones, and questioning of the 11 crew members (all Russian citizens) yielded no leads, Der Spiegel reported on May 30.
Dossier Center journalists uncovered evidence linking the Lauga to the Syrian port of Tartus in the summer of 2024. The ship suspiciously turned off its radar for 12 hours while docking at the port, where a Russian military base was still fully operational at the time. (The deactivated radar obscured this from ship-tracking services like MarineTraffic, but platforms like Global Fishing Watch still recorded the docking.) According to Dossier Center, the Lauga frequently visits ports outside major Western trade routes, making repeated trips to Iranian shores and Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan.
The Dossier Center also studied corporate records linking Lauga’s current owner, Idan Shipping, to Rosatom, Russia’s state atomic energy corporation. Idan Shipping’s CEO, Andrey Selyanin, spent many years managing a subsidiary of the Delo Group, one of Russia’s largest transportation holding companies, which is co-owned by Rosatom.
The Lauga frequently uses services from companies affiliated with the Delo Group. For example, in the port of Novorossiysk, it is represented by one of Delo’s subsidiaries. After it was searched in Zeebrugge, the Lauga returned to St. Petersburg and spent time moored at the Petrolesport terminal pier, which also belongs to the Delo Group.
Idan Shipping did not respond to The Dossier Center’s inquiries.
The HAV Dolphin
Two days before German officials tailed the Lauga and its drone swarm, a whole contingent of Dutch customs, local law enforcement, and national police reportedly descended on an arriving vessel at the Volkerak Locks. The Dossier Center writes that German officials likely tipped off their Dutch counterparts to the HAV Dolphin’s unusual behavior after it left Kaliningrad on April 23.
“It was moving unusually slowly — at an average speed of 7.6 knots, whereas the normal speed is 10–11 knots. This could be related to fuel conservation or technical problems, but it could also be part of a tactic used by many Russian vessels suspected of espionage,” sources told Dutch journalists at the publication Follow the Money.
The HAV Dolphin spent eight days anchored northwest of Kiel (not a usual anchoring point), near German military facilities, including the 1st Submarine Squadron, based in Eckernförde. Sources told multiple European news outlets that drones were spotted in the area while the HAV Dolphin held its position. This is likely why the ship was searched at Volkerak Locks, though the HAV Dolphin’s owner denies that the search took place.
Whatever the reason for the HAV Dolphin’s delay in the Netherlands, inspectors found no drones or anything suspicious on the ship. Questioning the seven crew members — again, all Russians — also yielded no results. The HAV Dolphin was released without charges and left for Spain. The ship continues to cruise around Europe to this day.
The Dossier Center reports that the ship’s owner, the Norwegian company Hav Bulk AS, stopped taking cargo and working with clients in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, according to public procurement records, the company still has its vessels serviced at the Pregolya shipyard in Kaliningrad, which also works on Rosatom ships. HAV Board Chairman Peter Kleppan told The Dossier Center and its media partners that the company opened a representative office in Kaliningrad in 2006 and began hiring “hardworking and highly qualified Russian sailors for coastal shipping.” The HAV Dolphin spent almost a month getting scheduled repairs in April 2024 before heading to the German port of Kiel.
Russia’s main message, probably
The failure of European officials to unearth hard evidence of Russian drones aboard civilian cargo ships isn’t hard to explain, experts told journalists. Niels Woudstra, an associate professor at the Netherlands Defense Academy, told The Dossier Center that he isn’t surprised that no drones were found on the Lauga or the HAV Dolphin: “A cargo ship is big, and drones can be disassembled and hidden. You'd have to search the entire ship to find them.”
Patrick Bolder, a security advisor at the Hague Center for Strategic Studies, pointed out that operators can even crash a drone into the water after finishing a flight to erase all traces.
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data senior analyst Nikita Gurkov linked the drone incidents to dozens of other cases across northern Europe since February 2022, half of which have involved military ships, military bases, and their surroundings in Germany and Britain. For example, between February 27 and March 7, 2025, drones were observed flying over naval bases, ports, and chemical plants in northern and eastern Germany on an almost daily basis. According to Gurkov, Russia’s main message to Europeans is clear: that it is watching and can reach Western targets.
Original report by Natalia Telegina and Ilya Rozhdestvensky for The Dossier Center
Summary for Meduza in English by Kevin Rothrock