A political crisis that could weaken the war effort itself What Zelensky’s anti-corruption U-turn means at a ‘precarious moment’ for Ukraine
On July 31, the Ukrainian parliament will consider a new anti-corruption bill designed to undo the damage from a piece of legislation it passed just last week. The controversial law, which deprived Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) of their independence, sparked the first large-scale protests Ukraine has seen since Russia’s 2022 invasion. Faced with backlash from Ukraine’s civil society and international partners alike, President Volodymyr Zelensky backpedaled immediately, introducing a new draft law he says will restore the agencies’ independence.
But whether Ukrainian lawmakers will support a reversal remains an open question. While RBC Ukraine reports that according to its sources, the president has the necessary votes, the Financial Times reported just last Friday that as many as 70 MPs from Zelensky’s own party had qualms about supporting the bill, fearing retribution from re-empowered anti-corruption prosecutors. For more insight into Zelensky’s anti-corruption U-turn and what the political crisis means for Ukraine at this juncture in the war, Meduza spoke to analyst and former diplomat Balázs Jarábik, the founder of the political risk consultancy Minority Report and a partner at R.Politik.
— Why are the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) so important to Ukrainians?
— These institutions were born out of the anti-corruption and judiciary reforms after Maidan, and they were highly integrated into the [2014 European Union–Ukraine] Association Agreement and now the European integration process for Ukraine as a candidate country. Overall, this has been considered the key reform with regard to Ukraine moving toward the West and the E.U. in particular. It’s also been a very sensitive [issue] since a number of achievements — for example, the visa-free agreement [with the E.U.] — are dependent on Ukraine’s fight against corruption. So, these institutions have become a symbol.
There has been a lot of criticism about the effectiveness of these institutions, and a good [amount] of it is valid. Just two months ago, an international audit, which was also part of the reform process, [determined] that NABU’s performance was “moderately” successful.
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These are state agencies, so their independence or quasi-independence from law enforcement agencies such as the prosecutor general, the SBU, or the State Bureau of Investigation is one of the key indicators for both E.U. institutions and local anti-corruption activists. Hence, the very strong reaction [from European partners] despite it being vacation season in Brussels and the E.U.
— President Zelensky didn’t frame the original bill that was passed in terms of the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies or the concerns of international partners. Instead, he talked about Russian influence within these institutions. Is there any merit to those allegations?
— It’s hard to say. I haven’t seen the evidence, so I don’t really know. But I can say that Russian influence has been the [formal] justification for a lot of things the Zelensky administration has done, which have been legally or constitutionally tricky. For example, the sanctions against Ukrainian citizens [imposed] by the National Security and Defense Council since 2021.
Russian influence was also [the reason for] canceling the first round of the [2024] presidential elections in Romania. So, I assume that the presidential administration has kept using this [justification] under the assumption that the E.U. would not be able to push back. And exactly the opposite happened.
The new law was really about subordination. There are a lot of emotional takes [claiming] that this law destroys [NABU and SAPO] — that’s not true. There’s no change in their capacity, leadership, or anything structural. But there are a number of changes that essentially undermine these agencies and subordinate them to the prosecutor general.
This is very important because these changes have been in the making since the new prosecutor general, [Ruslan Kravchuk], was appointed [in June]. [Kravchuk] is a 36-year-old law enforcement professional who had applied to various positions in the anti-corruption agencies and had never been able to make it to any high-level post until the administration elevated him to the most important position in the law enforcement hierarchy. So he is generally considered very loyal to the president’s office.
Again, it’s about independence. These specialized agencies have created a state within the state, and Ukraine has been a battlefield not only in terms of Russian aggression, but also in terms of these anti-corruption agencies and reforms. Usually, such agencies are subordinate within the state hierarchy. So the [issue] of them needing to be independent raises the question of independence from whom? And the answer here is very simple: they need to be independent from [those in] power. They need to be independent and empowered enough to investigate high-level corruption.
And guess what? That’s exactly what they have been doing over the past few months. It’s very important to understand that these agencies have been aiming very, very high. And so, in [the context of] Ukrainian political culture per se, they crossed the Rubicon. They targeted a deputy prime minister, [Oleksiy] Chernyshov, and a very close associate of the president, [businessman Tymur] Mindich, through his [relatives]. An SBU [officer] has also been targeted. I assume that the president’s office was reacting to all these developments and saying, “Wait a minute, we need to stop this.” However, with this reaction, the president’s office also crossed the Rubicon — by touching the symbols of these post-Maidan anti-corruption and judiciary reforms.
The miscalculation of the president’s office was [to assume] that after the Rome Recovery Conference, the U.S.–Ukraine minerals deal, and amid a Russian offensive, the E.U. would accept it and refocus everything on ensuring that Ukraine has whatever it needs for defense, essentially allowing for a final consolidation of power. That didn’t happen.
— Zelensky faced backlash from civil society in Ukraine and from international partners. The E.U. even halted $1.7 billion in aid. How important were each of these factors in terms of getting him to reverse course?
— The Trump administration didn’t say anything, but U.S. senators did, and all European [partners,] including the U.K., were all on the same page about this [legislation] being a no-go. But I think the protests were equally important. Why? Because the presidential administration is preparing for elections. They understand this, and I think it’s one of the reasons they need to get the corruption scandals under control. You cannot have an election campaign that is dictated by corruption scandals against you. It’s a no-go.
If you look at the government reshuffle, only those ministers who were tainted by corruption scandals were changed: [former Deputy Prime Minister Olha] Stefanishyna, Chernyshov, a couple of others. [Former Prime Minister Denys] Shmyhal, for example, wasn’t, so he stayed in the government. [Former Defense Minister Rustem] Umerov had to leave because there were a lot of corruption accusations related to defense procurement. That’s another very important thing: these investigations were all targeting defense procurement, which, during a war, is also considered a Rubicon.
But I think the protests were even more important within this framework of preparing for elections. It was the first [large-scale] protests during the war, and the demographic was young people. It wasn’t [just] the professional activists, meaning those who are being paid to work on anti-corruption and all that. These were young people, and if you look at the slogans, the floodgates are essentially open because they were saying that Zelensky is a dictator. With this, politics is returning big time. It was like a flash flood, so I think it had a big impact on the president’s office.
Zelensky said this himself: “We hear you. We need to listen to these voices.” I think there’s a realization that this is not a conspiracy against them. There’s genuine frustration. There have been sporadic protests in the regions against forced mobilization and a lot of other things, and this is still going on. So this anger and frustration have been gathering, and I think this had a very big impact.
— Zelensky submitted a new anti-corruption bill to parliament that he says will restore the independence of NABU and SAPO, while also protecting the legal system from Russian influence and interference. To what extent would this legislation actually be a reversal?
— It seems like a complete retreat. The question is whether the president’s office will have the necessary votes in the parliament [to pass the bill]. This is also a shake-up of the fragile majority [Zelensky’s Servant of the People party holds]. For a while, it was a transactional parliamentary majority, and now Zelensky’s U-turn has really weakened his grip over it. Whether they will be able to find the necessary votes is a very big question.
— The Financial Times reported that as many as 70 lawmakers from Zelensky’s party are uneasy about supporting this bill.
— A parliamentary revolt against Zelensky is also possible in the current circumstances, if there were the necessary votes for a new majority. It wouldn’t be easy; I think the president’s office still has the necessary votes, but it’s not impossible to think that there could be a new majority. And that they could even force Zelensky to not just reshuffle but actually change the government this time.
The opposition has wanted a new governing coalition for a long time, one that would reflect the opposition and the fact that Servant of the People lost its majority over a year ago. I don’t think this is going to happen, but again, Zelensky has complicated things with this retreat.
— What other options do lawmakers have if they’re not going to support the new anti-corruption bill, but they don’t want to reject it outright either? Is it possible that this just gets completely dragged out?
— Not showing up [is an option]. But, you know, not showing up is also a choice because then they’re essentially making the retreat possible. And the current system where the specialized [anti-corruption] agencies are under the prosecutor general’s control would stay [in place]. One of my sources told me that NABU was already going after a number of MPs. So there is a genuine fear among the MPs that if they were to vote for the new law, then [NABU] would go after them even more. Therefore, there’s motivation not to vote for it.
There is genuine anger in policymaking circles against the anti-corruption agencies and the anti-corruption community because they feel that they are [exercising] political control over them and not in a good way. This has been a criticism of these agencies as well as the [anti-corruption] reforms from the very beginning.
— Politicians who supported the original bill, like former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, for example, argue that agencies like NABU were imposed by the West and therefore undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. How widely held is that view?
— I think it’s widely held simply because if you look at the polling numbers, these institutions are not popular. Their trust ratings have been quite low. The truth is that these organizations were born out of Western conditionality. At the same time, the West is providing a lot of support for Ukraine, so obviously they can request or press for some guarantees that these funds are not going to be stolen and are being put to good use.
— Is there an angle of this political crisis that you think isn’t being paid enough attention?
— I think the most important thing is that we are seeing an unfolding political crisis in Ukraine during wartime, which could weaken the war effort itself. If you’re putting it into context, the Russians are getting better on the battlefield, unfortunately. They’re putting a lot of pressure not only on the army but also on [Ukrainian air defense] with these relentless drone attacks. And the president’s office, which until now had been keeping things under control both at home and in [relations with the West], has been suddenly very weakened.
I always say that in Ukraine, every consolidation of power — no matter how unprecedented — has been illusory simply because we always have informal networks and informal influence [working] alongside formal ones. And this is a prime example of that.
I myself am very curious about how the president’s office will solve [this crisis]. If there is a full retreat, Zelensky will be weakened at the exact time when Ukraine very much needs strong leadership. And if there is not a full retreat, then the protests and the political crisis could go on and even increase, engulfing the political class [at a time] when maintaining unity and integrity is very important. Unfortunately, this is a very precarious moment for Ukraine.
Interview by Eilish Hart