Could Russia occupy all of Donbas in a year? And what if Ukraine’s ‘fortress belt’ falls? Meduza’s military analysts answer readers’ biggest questions about the war (part 1)
Last week, we asked our Russian-language readers to send in their most pressing questions about the Russia–Ukraine war. We received hundreds of messages in response, and our Explainers team reviewed each one, grouped similar questions by topic, and then selected the most representative ones to answer directly. In part one of this series, our military analysts discuss the state of Russia’s ongoing Donbas offensive and the fate of Ukraine’s “fortress belt.”
Read part two of this series, which focuses on the risk of Russia expanding its war beyond Ukraine, here.
First, some context
Over the course of Donald Trump’s chaotic negotiations with Moscow and Kyiv, the U.S. president has unexpectedly managed to bring the warring sides’ positions closer together — right up to a red line that neither country currently seems able to cross. Contrary to what most Western analysts believed, everything has seemingly come down to territory. Judging from media reports, Russian President Vladimir Putin came up with a special “compromise” for Trump: instead of demanding that Kyiv hand over all four of the regions that Russia claims to have annexed, he’s now asking for just the two Donbas regions, Donetsk and Luhansk. In doing so, he set a new political objective for the war (other issues, such as “security guarantees” for both sides, seem to have been left aside for now.)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly stated that Kyiv isn’t willing to give up any territory. This stance is likely driven in part by his understanding that accepting Putin’s terms could spark a political crisis at home.
Russia’s ongoing offensive
“Putin and [Russian Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov keep saying that everything’s going fine, and that the Russian Armed Forces have been advancing about 22 kilometers (13.5 miles) a day. Is it really possible that in a year, Russia will occupy all of Donbas? And if it does, will it be willing to enter into negotiations?” — Dan
“Will Russian troops be able to capture Kramatorsk and Sloviansk?” — Kostya
Judging by the overall contours of Russia’s current offensive, which began in the spring, Moscow’s plan appears to be exactly what the second question describes. Three Russian formations are attempting, in the span of a few months, to advance simultaneously toward the approaches to the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk urban area — the last densely populated area of Donbas still under Ukrainian control.
In this scenario, Putin’s calculation is straightforward: Kyiv refused to cede Donbas voluntarily but would end up losing it anyway — at the cost of thousands of Ukrainian lives. That, in turn, could trigger a political crisis in Ukraine. Judging by Trump’s statements, this is the very dilemma Putin tried to present to the United States: that if Kyiv refuses to give up land in exchange for a ceasefire, Donbas would be taken by force, at heavy cost to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
If Russia occupies all of Donbas, the Kremlin — at least in Putin’s view — would then be in a position to demand that the West and Ukraine address broader political issues, ranging from Ukraine’s “neutrality” and “demilitarization” to a possible change of government.
Right now, Russia’s goal is to strengthen that negotiating position with tangible battlefield gains — namely, reaching Kramatorsk and Sloviansk through concentric advances from the north, east, and south. For more than six months now, the Russian command’s every move has clearly followed this plan:
- The “Center” grouping, which operated south of Pokrovsk until 2025, is trying to seize Pokrovsk and advance north through Dobropillia toward the western outskirts of Kramatorsk.
- The “South” grouping, having captured the Ukrainian strongholds of Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Bilohorivka, is pushing toward Kostyantynivka and Siversk to approach Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from the south and west.
- The “West” grouping is taking control of the area between the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers (including the city of Lyman) and threatening to cross the Siverskyi Donets opposite Sloviansk. At the same time, its units are trying to capture Kupyansk — with the long-term goal of cutting Sloviansk and Kramatorsk off from their main supply routes from Kharkiv.
Ukraine’s tasks have also become clearer: the Ukrainian Armed Forces needs to halt the Russian advance on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, which have effectively become the main political objective of the war at this stage. From an operational standpoint, this task is somewhat eased by the fact that, as Russia’s concentric offensive unfolds, the front line around the Kramatorsk urban area is contracting, allowing Ukraine to concentrate its defenses. The Russian command clearly understands this problem, which is why it’s trying to stretch the line of contact in other areas.
One of Russia’s most powerful forces, the“East” grouping — reinforced by the 41st Combined Arms Army and the 90th Tank Division transferred from the “Center” grouping — is advancing in the opposite, western direction from Pokrovsk, along the border of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.
This offensive, which continually extends the front line, forces Ukraine to redeploy reserves. At any moment, Russian troops in this sector could pivot north to cut off Ukrainian positions in the Donetsk region from the city of Dnipro, or continue westward to attempt a breakthrough of Ukrainian defenses in the eastern Zaporizhzhia region. For now, Ukrainian forces in this area prefer to counterattack when possible and otherwise conduct a gradual, controlled withdrawal westward.
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One “casualty” of these political and military shifts has been a front that only recently seemed important but has now lost strategic relevance: both armies are actively transferring units from the Russia-Ukraine border area in the Kursk and Sumy regions to Donbas.
It remains unclear what timeline the Russian General Staff has set for reaching the Kramatorsk agglomeration. Judging by statements from General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s top generals still dream of a decisive Ukrainian defeat. Gerasimov reported to Putin that Russian forces had encircled large Ukrainian groupings near Pokrovsk and Kupyansk. If true, that would have disrupted Ukraine’s entire defensive system — but in reality (as video evidence shows), no such encirclement exists, just as there was none in Russia’s Kursk region earlier this year, despite Putin’s claims to the contrary.
In the coming weeks, Ukraine will likely have to withdraw from the Pokrovsk area and from its bridgehead on the east bank of the Oskil River near Kupyansk to avoid encirclement — suffering heavier losses than it would have if it had pulled back earlier. However, a complete collapse of Ukraine’s defenses, resulting in a chaotic withdrawal and thousands of prisoners, is unlikely. Ukrainian forces are exploiting every opportunity to slow the Russian advance.
For now, any acceleration of the Russian offensive seems improbable. The balance of forces, entrenched tactical patterns, and the pace of operations all make a dramatic breakthrough unlikely.
It’s possible that Russia’s leadership is not even aiming for rapid progress. Even at the current pace, the Russian army could reach the outskirts of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk — by mid-2026. This would require capturing not just open terrain but the key logistical hubs of Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka, Siversk, and Lyman. Russian assault units are already operating on the outskirts, or within, all of these cities.
Yet Russia’s complete capture of Donbas is far from guaranteed. Tactical and operational difficulties are preventing Russian forces from accelerating their advance. Ukraine may still be able to halt it, or make it so costly for the Kremlin that it will no longer resemble a victory. However, this would require determined, coordinated efforts from Ukraine’s leadership, society, and Western partners.
Ukraine’s ‘fortress belt’
“How great is the risk of a crisis or collapse of the Ukrainian Armed Forces if the Russians manage to capture the entire ‘fortress belt’ (Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk) by the end of 2026? […] If this scenario occurs, would the Russian army effectively be able to advance rapidly westward and northwestward across the flat and less populated steppe toward Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and the southeastern part of the Kharkiv region?” — Kornei
Existing fortifications now play a diminishing role in Ukraine’s defenses. Concentrating troops in fortified positions has become suicidal: the Russian Armed Forces are deliberately trying to draw Ukrainian units into strongholds in order to destroy them with precision glide bombs. For this reason, the Ukrainian military is dispersing its forces — from infantry to artillery and drone operators.
It’s the Russian army that needs to capture cities to use them as logistical hubs — to amass troops in basements, industrial ruins, and other solid structures from which to continue the offensive. That’s why Russian forces are trying to capture Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, and Siversk. Without such supply centers, their advance becomes extremely difficult. This is precisely why the Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding on to large populated areas.
In the near future, all Russian operations will likely focus on advancing toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, while also extending the front near Huliaipole, Orikhiv, and Zaporizhzhia. In the latter case, however, Russian forces do not appear to have the strength to capture the entire Zaporizhzhia region.
Meduza’s Explainers team