Meduza asks NYT reporter Anatoly Kurmanaev about the limits of Russia’s alliance with Venezuela amid rising U.S. pressure
Russia’s closest ally in South America is facing escalating tensions with the United States. On November 11, Venezuela announced a “massive mobilization” of military personnel in response to an ongoing build-up of U.S. forces in the Caribbean Sea. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. military has repeatedly struck alleged drug trafficking boats off Venezuela’s coast, while in private, some U.S. officials are reportedly calling for regime change. Against this backdrop, Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro has appealed directly to Russia’s Vladimir Putin for assistance in the form of weapons and other military hardware, according to reporting by The Washington Post. But with Russia’s attention and resources tied up in the war in Ukraine, it’s unclear how much help the Kremlin can still offer — or whether it has the political will to do so. For more insight into the current state of Moscow’s relationship with Caracas, Meduza spoke with Anatoly Kurmanaev, a Russia reporter for The New York Times who previously covered Venezuela.
The following interview has been lightly edited and abridged for length and clarity.
— How has Moscow’s relationship with Venezuela evolved since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine?
— I think the most important element is distraction. Russia doesn’t have enough resources or bandwidth to be engaged in Venezuela to the extent that it has been in previous years. So the relationship has become more distant, the ties have started to atrophy a bit.
The strategic alliance between Russia and Venezuela has evolved. It’s gone through many phases since Hugo Chávez took power in 1999 — the same year as Putin. When Venezuela was flush with oil money in the 2000s, Russia benefited massively through exports of weapons and other machinery to Venezuela, as well as skilled workers who went to work there. After Venezuela went into a long-term economic crisis starting in 2014, its value to Russia continued to decrease because it basically became too poor to spend a significant amount of money on Russian products.
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For Venezuela, the main advantage of [its relationship with] Russia in recent years was having a window into the global financial system. Venezuela was gradually sanctioned, and the sanctions ratcheted up over the years. The big hit came in 2019, during [U.S. President Donald] Trump’s first term in power, when he basically banned the sale of Venezuelan oil. This made it very difficult for Venezuela to sell its main product, and it turned to the Russian market for sales, banking, and [other] transactions. Russia was a way for Venezuela to bypass sanctions because at the time, it was still relatively connected to the global financial system. And obviously, after the start of the [full-scale] war in Ukraine in 2022, Russia became even more sanctioned than Venezuela. So Russia lost that attractiveness for Venezuelan officials, state companies, etc., as a place where they could move and keep their money.
Venezuela hasn’t really emerged as a major diplomatic supporter of Russia’s invasion. The economic ties haven’t been broken, but they’ve plateaued at a certain level where there’s still some trade investment between the two countries, but it’s not what it was before. [During] this particular period of tensions between the U.S. and Russia, we just haven’t seen Russia get involved [in Venezuela] to the extent that it has in the past. During the previous standoff in 2019, Russia publicly, sort of ostentatiously, sent military and economic advisors [to Venezuela]. And Rosneft played a very big role in moving Venezuelan oil despite American sanctions. With this [current] crisis, we’ve seen Moscow being quite muted [in its response]. In sum, the war in Ukraine has decreased the attractiveness of a strategic alliance for both parties.
— Moscow and Caracas recently ratified a Strategic Partnership Treaty, and Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has said Moscow supports Venezuela “in defending its national sovereignty.” But does Russia even have the capacity to offer tangible help right now, given the demands of the war in Ukraine?
— It’s easy for Zakharova to just issue these rousing statements, and it’s easy to sign this piece of paper. It doesn’t really mean anything [or] oblige anyone to actually put any money on the table. In terms of concrete support, we just haven’t really seen much of it so far from the Russian side. Does it have resources to send to Venezuela? We frankly don’t know, but the Syria example is quite telling here. When its biggest ally in the Middle East came under threat, Russia just basically washed its hands [of then-President Bashar al-Assad] and then stood by while [his regime] fell.
We don’t know how far Trump is willing to go in terms of his standoff with the Venezuelan government, but if he were to escalate militarily, it’s difficult to imagine Russia throwing weight behind trying to decisively shift the balance in Venezuela’s favor. What could it do? The most advanced Venezuelan weapon systems are Russian-made. In particular, Venezuela has S-300 air defense systems and Sukhoi fighter jets, which could theoretically pose a threat to U.S. military personnel. They’re probably the most threatening part of Venezuela’s arsenal in the case of a potential U.S. attack.
There’s a lot of speculation about how functional these systems are — whether they’re still operational, whether they’re rusted out, broken down, or whether there’s anyone still able to operate them. Russia could potentially send some advisors [and] technicians to repair them and bring them up to speed. In late October, a Russian cargo plane that’s been associated with military transports touched down in Caracas, fueling speculation that it carried some advisors, technicians, or soldiers. We don’t have any proof of that, but it is theoretically something that Russia could do. I think the short answer is that if the U.S. were to launch a concerted attack on Venezuela, it’s very unlikely that Russia would step in in a decisive manner that might alter the balance of that confrontation.
— How much of a blow would it be to Russia’s credibility if it doesn’t come to Nicolás Maduro’s aid?
— The Syria example is very telling here: That the Kremlin was willing to swallow this major blow to its reputation, to its standing, given the balance of forces on the ground.
To the best of my understanding, the Kremlin’s view is that these geopolitical setbacks — Syria, Iran, and perhaps Venezuela in the foreseeable future — are acceptable and will be righted or overshadowed by this glorious victory that it envisions in Ukraine. If [Russia] can crush the Ukrainian government and achieve its core objectives in Ukraine, it can present itself to the world [and say,] “Look, we faced the military pressure of the entire West and we defeated it, we succeeded.” So whatever prestige and standing around the world is lost as these regional allies fall or lose power will be regained and multiplied by many factors through a victory in Ukraine that will put Russia back on the pedestal of world superpowers.
If Venezuela changes governments and the new government has a pro-Western leader who will turn the country [in the opposite direction], so be it. That’s an acceptable geopolitical price to pay. All of [Russia’s] attention and resources are focused on Ukraine.
— How important is Venezuela to Russia’s broader foreign policy today? What would it mean for Moscow if Maduro were to fall?
— At this stage, the economic ties are fairly limited. Rosneft still operates [in Venezuela] and produces a significant but not particularly huge amount of oil. There are still weapons maintenance contracts that Russia services. So it’s still a significant ally, but Russia doesn’t have the resources or the political will to sacrifice any meaningful amount of resources to try to keep Venezuela in its sphere of influence.
The potential downfall of Maduro is probably something that the Kremlin could accept. Presumably, this could be part of broader negotiations between Putin and Trump for all of Venezuela. It could become a bargaining chip, where Russia basically stands aside and doesn’t get involved in the Venezuelan conflict in return for concessions in Ukraine or Central Asia. So it’s certainly an alliance or sphere of influence that Russia would be willing to trade in any broader agreement with the U.S.
— Some analysts have suggested that a confrontation between the U.S. and Venezuela could serve Russia’s interests by diverting attention from Ukraine. Do you see that as a real factor in Moscow’s calculus?
— It’s probably not something that they’re hoping for. I think on balance, they would prefer for Maduro to stay in power, but they’ll certainly take that benefit. It’s almost inevitable that a major military conflict or a war in Venezuela would draw U.S. attention away from Ukraine. So it certainly would be a sort of consolation prize for Putin that he would be willing to take.
We also have to keep in mind that Venezuela and Russia now compete for a share of the Chinese oil market. Both countries primarily export to China because of Western sanctions. China is one country that’s still willing to buy the oil, [although] obviously at a discount. So Russian and Venezuelan oil producers increasingly find themselves competing for basically one customer.
A disruption in Venezuelan oil exports would certainly benefit Russia in the short term because it would free up more of the Chinese market for Russian exports. And a war in Venezuela would almost certainly raise global oil prices, which would obviously benefit Russia as well. However, the short-term benefits of the diversion of U.S. attention and a disruption in the global oil market would still be consolation prizes for Russia. I think they would very much prefer for Maduro to stay in power.
— Is there an angle of this story you feel is missing from Western media coverage?
— Venezuela is a deeply authoritarian, repressive state with almost no free media left. The media industry has been destroyed through repression and economic crisis, and there’s little quality reporting coming out of Venezuela. There are also fewer and fewer foreign correspondents based in Venezuela because it’s increasingly difficult and unsafe for them [there]. So by and large, this conflict has been covered in Western media from abroad, by reporters based in Washington or in other Latin American countries.
These reporters are doing the best job they can, but obviously the reality is that [their coverage] tends to prioritize the viewpoints of actors based outside Venezuela, [including] the U.S. government and the Venezuelan opposition, which is largely in exile and sees the standoff between Trump and Maduro as its best chance of taking power. So these actors assume an outsized role in [how] this conflict is presented, and the voices or wishes of Venezuelan people are often lost.
The prospect of military intervention in Venezuela is covered from many angles that seem to downplay the wishes of Venezuelan people. And because the Venezuelan opposition won such a massive share of votes in last year’s presidential election, [around] 70 percent, they are presented as having a mandate to push for any policy that achieves political change, including military intervention by a foreign power. That is not necessarily the case. Just because 70 percent of people voted for you doesn’t mean that 70 percent want you to orchestrate an invasion to change the government. I think not enough journalistic effort has been spent in trying to figure out what the people want. They want change, that’s very clear, but are they willing to risk war? What cost are they willing to pay to achieve that political change? I think there’s certainly more that Western media can do to give Venezuelan people a bigger role in creating a narrative for this conflict.
— Do you have a sense of what people in Venezuela think of Russia?
— It’s a very polarized country and the view of Russia very much depends on people’s political views. Government supporters, who represent about 30 percent of the population, view Russia’s investments or involvement in Venezuela positively. And the opposition, [who represent] the majority of the country today, see Russia’s involvement as very negative. I would even say that there’s this propensity among the more radical faction of the opposition to just blame Russia for everything, [claiming that] Maduro would have been long gone if it wasn’t for Russia. Russia has certainly played a significant role over the years in propping up Maduro’s government, especially in key crisis moments. But I think it’s a stretch to say that the only reason Maduro’s in power is because of Russia. This overstates the depth of Russia’s involvement and capacity to influence events on the ground.
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