‘Eating their own’: What the latest scandal among Russia’s pro-war pundits says about the Z-blogosphere’s future
Apti Alaudinov, commander of Chechnya’s “Akhmat” special forces unit, has once again landed in the middle of a political-media scandal — this time not with fringe Z-bloggers but with Kremlin-friendly propagandists themselves. Journalists from RFE/RL’s Caucasus news service Kavkaz.Realii dug into the grievances the Chechen general has accumulated within his own camp and what’s really driving the latest wave of scandals among Russia’s pro-war media figures. Meduza shares an abridged translation of the report.
In early November, Russia’s Center for Countering Extremism detained Oksana Kobeleva, author of the pro-war Telegram channel “Okhranota V Vatnike.” The official reason for her arrest was not disclosed, but her fellow pro-war blogger Vladimir Romanov claimed she was charged with “discrediting” the Russian army — despite being one of its most vocal supporters. He cited a November 6 court record, though the case could not be found in the online court database at the time of this article’s writing.
Just days before her detention, Kobeleva had published a post questioning Apti Alaudinov, the deputy head of the Defense Ministry’s Main Military-Political Directorate and the commander of the Akhmat special forces. She asked why his comments in a year-old interview contradicted the Defense Ministry’s official version of the deaths of two Russian soldiers with call signs “Ernest” and “Goodwin.”
In 2024, Dmitry “Ernest” Lysakovsky and Sergey “Goodwin” Gritsay accused their regiment commander, Igor Puzik, of dealing drugs at the front in Ukraine. Soon after, they were removed from their drone operator roles, reassigned as assault troops, and sent on a suicide mission. After their deaths, an investigation led by Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov found no wrongdoing by commanders — and no evidence of drug trafficking in the unit.
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Kobeleva pointed out that Alaudinov’s remarks seemed to undermine the Defense Ministry’s conclusions and could even be interpreted as acknowledging corruption at high levels. But what really inflamed the Z-community was that she compared Alaudinov to another controversial figure: blogger Svetlana Montyan.
A new scapegoat
Montyan, a former Ukrainian lawyer, is currently facing several criminal charges in Ukraine, including collaboration with Russia. She moved to Russia in 2021 and, after the full-scale invasion, began fundraising for the Russian military. At the same time, she appeared on national TV, clashed with propagandists, and publicly feuded with top pro-Kremlin pundit Vladimir Solovyov, who accused her of swearing at “his president,” Vladimir Putin.
In October, a 2015 video resurfaced in which Montyan insults Putin and says that the Crimea “referendum” was fake. Soon after, the FSB raided her home, Russia’s Federal Financial Monitoring Service added her to its list of extremists and terrorists, and she was placed under a travel ban. The exact charges remain unclear, but among Russian propagandists, credit for triggering her prosecution was widely given to none other than Kobeleva. Solovyov himself congratulated her. (Okhranota V Vatnike is widely believed to be part of his channel network.)
After Kobeleva questioned Alaudinov, however, Solovyov quickly flipped. He denounced her, called Alaudinov a “brilliant Russian general” and an “outstanding religious thinker,” and Alaudinov’s own subordinates delivered thinly veiled threats. The general himself declared that those behind the channel would be “taught a lesson.”
Kobeleva promptly reversed course, blamed Montyan for everything, apologized for the “friendly fire” that “played into the enemy’s hands,” and deleted her posts.
Journalist Ilya Shepelin, who tracks pro-Kremlin media, believes Kobeleva was acting alone — and overplayed her hand in an attempt to impress her superiors. He described Solovyov as her channel’s “political cover.” According to Shepelin:
This Telegram channel was part of Solovyov’s network: there are various Z-supporters, and they look for different kinds of “protection” if they themselves aren’t yet integrated into some circle close to the authorities. But since it wasn’t Solovyov himself who staged this attack on Alaudinov’s honor, he didn’t step in — if he had supported it, we would have seen a “network-against-network” war. Why didn’t he step in? Because Solovyov works on command: sometimes the command is “Don’t touch,” and sometimes it’s “Attack.” And if one of Solovyov’s subordinates doesn’t follow the party line, then there’s no need to defend them.
Shepelin noted that Solovyov has tangled with Alaudinov before — over Z-war correspondent Roman Alekhin, who joined Akhmat, left three weeks later with three medals, and sparked a brief public spat. That dispute ended swiftly when Solovyov called Alaudinov a friend and invited him on air.
Another line of fire
Around the same time, Alaudinov drew criticism from Marina Akhmedova, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin agency Regnum and a member of Russia’s Presidential Human Rights Council. She objected to a video showing a schoolgirl reciting a poem praising Alaudinov as a national role model and ending with the line: “God is one, Allah is great.”
Akhmedova argued that the “Islamic messaging” coming from a “presumably Russian schoolgirl” was inappropriate and called Alaudinov “the most garrulous general,” unable to live without constant attention.
Alaudinov retaliated immediately, accusing his opponents of being “Navalny supporters” and calling Akhmedova a “representative of a brothel” who dared to criticize a combat general.
Chechnya’s human rights commissioner, Mansur Soltaev, then entered the conflict, warning Akhmedova that her remarks could be interpreted as “discrediting the army” unless she apologized. She refused — calling Alaudinov “hysterically thin-skinned” and dismissing Soltaev’s threats:
Minor officials cry “discrediting the army” at the slightest thing — usually in response to legitimate criticism. Now any criticism is labeled as “discrediting.” Don’t create situations that force people to criticize you.
What’s really going on?
Political analyst Ivan Preobrazhensky told Kavkaz.Realii that he views these clashes primarily as a fight over the propaganda budgets allocated by Kremlin First Deputy Chief of Staff Alexey Gromov and the Defense Ministry, as well as the struggle for public influence.
At the same time, he warned against interpreting the infighting as a sign of systemic collapse. “This isn’t yet the kind of internal warfare that would signal a real crisis,” he said.
Russian political scientist Abbas Gallyamov agreed that money drives the conflicts. “Propagandists mimic the behavior of the authorities, whose only value is access to the trough, which causes constant fighting. In the Kremlin’s system, ideology is empty words masking real interests,” he said. “Propagandists treat ideology the same way.”
Shepelin pointed out that Solovyov himself openly campaigns to “clear the field” of independent bloggers raising money for the war effort:
Only one dominant player should remain — the Vladimir Rudolfovich Solovyov fund or some other Kremlin-approved giant. Everyone else is supposed to disappear because they’re siphoning off money. And it’s a very convenient setup: Solovyov’s fund is advertised on Solovyov Live, meaning the channel earns money from a fund that itself receives donations and likely state funding. Public money becomes fund money, the fund buys ads, and the revenue lands in Solovyov’s pocket.
Shepelin argued that the root cause of this escalating infighting lies in how the Kremlin system works. Open dissenters have been jailed or driven abroad; those who remain keep quiet out of fear. But security agencies still need to produce a steady supply of “enemies” — so they turn inward.
While the liberal opposition was hundreds of kilometers from the Kremlin’s line, these Z-bloggers are just a kilometer away. Solovyov is half a meter away. So now even Alekhin or any Z-blogger who occasionally speaks their mind becomes an enemy. Any opinion not initiated by the state is dangerous. With no one else left, they start eating their own.
He predicted that the pressure will only intensify — progressing from online feuds to foreign-agent labels, extremist designations, and eventually prison.
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